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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HILDA CRELLIN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 7763 
NOELLEEN THOMAS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDAN-T AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CAS-E 
This is an action brought by plaintiff and appellant 
herein to recover damages for an alleged slander. Plain-
tiff alleges that on the 5th day of October, A.D. 1949, de-
fendant said of and concerning defendant as follows: 
"I told Mrs. Cummings that Mrs. Ctellin had worked in 
a house of prostitution"; further plaintiff alleges defend-
ant in the early part of April of 1949 said the, following 
words of and concerning plaintiff, to wit: "Mrs. Crellin 
was a whore." 
Defendant testified (Trans. 39) that while plaintiff 
and she were both working at the telephone office in 
Tooele, Mrs. Crellin, while working on the operator's 
"board" had said of another employee a single woman, 
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that she had been entertaining boys at her home for $2.00 
a night. Defendant testified that she then said "I thought 
she was the last person on earth that should make re-
marks if what I heard about her was true." (Trans. 40) 
When asked by Barbara Cummings, one of defend-
ant's witnesses defendant answered, "and I told her I 
had heard she came from a house of prostitution." 
Defendant answered with a general denial and a 
further plea in mitigation of damages that the. words, if 
any, were not spoken maliciously of and concerning plain-
tiff. The case was tried before a jury on the 14th and 
15th days of November, A.D. 1950, and upon said latter 
date the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendant, in the sum of $500.00. 
Thereafter defendant mo:ved for a new trial on the 
ground of newly discoiVered evidence which could not be 
obtained and was not available to defendant by a diligent 
search prior to the time of the first trial, which motion 
was granted. Thereupon defendant amended her answer 
in which she denied the allegations of plaintiff's corn-
plaint and as a further and affirmative defense alleged 
that any words which were defamatory were true, that 
defendant had investigated the activities of plaintiff in 
about the year 1925 in Ely, White Pine County, State. of 
Nevada; that she discovered that in about 192·4 and 1925 
plaintiff had worked in two houses of prostitution, which 
were then known as the "Green Lantern" or the "Big 
Four Dance. Hall" and "Rhiney's Place" respectively; 
that said houses were located in Ely, in the State of 
Nevada, in the restricted Red Light District; that both 
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of said places were houses "\Yhere lewd persons congregate 
for immoral purposes; that innnoral won1en who worked 
in said houses of prostitution were known as "Dance Hall 
Girls" and ~'Crib girls." 
The ne"\Y trial thereafter came on for hearing before 
the court and jury on the 28th day of June, A.D. 1951; 
that said trial lasted into the 29th day of June, A.D. 
1951; upon which date the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of defendant and against plaintiff, "no cause of 
action." 
Plaintiff appeals from the verdict and judgment 
and also from the Court ruling setting aside the first 
verdict and granting to defendant a new trial. (T.rans. 
p. 20) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AS TO POINT ONE THAT THE COURT ERRED IN 
GIVING THE LAST SENTENCE OF INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
AND IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL FOR SUCH 
ERROR. 
As to point one that the Court erred in giving the 
last sentence of instruction No. 1 as follows: 
"The Court charges you that truth is an abso-
lute defense in action of slander, such as this case. 
If therefore you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that plaintiff did at any time in her life, 
work in a house of prostitution in any capacity, 
then and in that event, your verdict must be in 
favor of defendant and against plaintiff, 'no cause 
of action.' " 
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In this case it was uncontroverted that the places in 
Ely, Nevada, where plaintiff worked were in an area set 
apart and designated by the City Counsel of that city 
as a restricted district or the red light district. Mr. 
Alfred Tamblyn, a resident of Ely, White Pine County, 
Nevada, testified that he had lived in that city since Oc-
tober, 1909; that during that time he had held many pub-
lic offices and a.t the time of trial or on June 29, 1951, he 
was a County Commissioner of~said county. (Trans. 79) 
The witness testified that he served as the Sheriff of 
White Pine County during the years 1918 and 1919; that 
he had been the~ Mayor of the City of Ely from May 23, 
. 1923 to May 1931. (Trans. 79) He stated that the places 
known as the "Green Lantern" and "Rhiney's Place" 
were located in this restricted red light district which had 
been designated as such district by the city authorities 
so that they could have some control over it. (Trans. 80) 
He further testified that he had made many official 
inspections of the places as a deputy sheriff and as the 
mayor, and he described them. (Trans. 82) He testified 
that the girls would dance with the patrons of the place 
and would solicit men to dance with them and buy them 
drinks of liquor; that sometimes the girls would go off 
the. floor with these men whom they had solicited for 
drinks and to rooms adjoining or close by the dance floor. 
(Trans. 81) He testified further that both Rhiney's Place 
and the Green Lantern had the reputation of being houses 
of prostitution (Trans. 82) ; that in making his inspec-
tions as mayor of the City of Ely he observed that there 
were rooms or cribs adjacent to and adjoining the dance 
hall. (Trans. 82) 
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He testified further that all the girls who worked 
in the dance hall or in the cribs paid regular vagrancy 
fines and that the .. dance hall girls" took men to their 
cribs or rooms. (Trans. 83) 
The witness Harold Woods for defendant described 
in detail the practice and duties of a dance hall girl. He 
testified that as such they approached men who entered 
the dance hall and asked them to buy them a drink and 
dance with them for hire; that while dancing the man was 
solicited to go to the crib with her; that this was always 
the procedure and manner of conducting both the so 
called dance, halls known as "Rhiney's Place" and the 
"Green Lantern," where plaintiff admittedly worked. 
(Trans. 51) He also testified that Rhiney's Place had 
the reputation and was known as a whorehouse. (Trans. 
54) That the Green Lantern was also known as a house 
of prostitution. He testified further from his own ex-
perience that doors led off the dance hall and into rooms 
or cribs and that they were close to and adjoining the 
dance hall. (Trans. 49) 
Now, Mrs. Crellin, on cross examination admitted 
working in Rhiney's Place as a dance hall girl and that 
she solicited dances from strange men. (Trans. 20) 
Further she admitted working at the Green Lantern, as 
a dance hall girl. (Trans. 22) 
She also testified on cross examination that she 
would get paid by going to the bar after the orchestra 
had stopped playing and the man whom she had solicited 
would pay for the dance and would buy drinks; that she 
didn't know what he drank, but that she drank caramel 
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water, which was the color of whiskey, and that she re-
ceived a percentage from the operator of the house for 
the sale of liquor. 
"Rhiney's Place" and the "Green Lantern" were ad-
mittedly located in the restricted Red Light District. 
(Trans. 29) 
Under all of this evidence we submit that the plain-
tiff in no manner has been prejudiced by the instruction 
and that under the state of the record and the testimony 
a different verdict could not have been rightfully ren-
dered. The fact that the dance halls were in the restricted 
red light district which wa.s admitted and not in dispute, 
left the jury with only one common sense verdict; that 
the plaintiff worked there as a prostitute. 
For the sake of argument, even assuming the in-
struction was error it certainly was harmless and under 
the circumstances we submit the instruction complained 
of in no manner affected plaintiff or her consideration 
with the jury. 
An instruction which might be misleading but which 
has become immaterial by reason of the findings of the 
jury, is not a ground for granting a new trial. Kershaw 
v. Schafer, 88 Kan. 691, 129 Pac. 1137. 
In Southern Pac. Land Co. v. Dickerson, 65 Cal. 
App. 722·; 225 P. 5, the California Court held: 
"Where it ,is clear that the jury have disre-
garded an improper instruction, a new trial will 
not be granted for the misdirection." 
3 Am. Jur. 639 No. 1122: 
"The giving of an erroneous instruction is not 
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reversible error unless it results in prejudice to 
the appellant or plaintiff in error by injuriously 
affecting his 1naterial or substantial rights." 
(Cases therein cited.) 
See also Sha er v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah, 
p. 46 (234 P. 300 4 RCL 815 Sec. 74: 
"It is only ·w·hen an erroneous instruction 
has resulted in prejudicing the rights of the com-
plaining party that the judgment will be reversed 
and it is the general rule that such action will not 
be taken by the appellate Court for error in giv-
ing or refusing to give instructions if the verdict 
is manifestly right, or if it appears from the evi-
dence that no other verdict could have been prop-
erly returned by the jury under instructions that 
were entirely correct." 
We feel, however, the instruction was not error and 
properly given inasmuch as it was established that the 
places where plaintiff worked were in the restricted red 
light district and if the jury found that the place where 
plaintiff worked was a house of prostitution in view of 
the evidence as to her duties, the jury could not under 
any circumstances have come to any other conclusion. 
In Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R. Co. v. Kneirim, 
152 Ill. 458, 43 American State Reports 260, the Court 
held: · 
"An instruction though erroneous will not re-
quire the granting of a new trial if it appears from . 
the evidence that no other verdict could have been 
properly returned by the jury under the circum-
stances." 
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Either by adding the words "In any capacity" or 
by leaving the words out of the instruction, the jury in 
this case could come to no other conclusion than that 
plaintiff had been a prostitute, in view of the record of 
the, evidence. 
The plaintiff's testimony that the dance hall was a 
legitimate business for customers in a lewd district where 
prostitutes were coralled and designated to· stay, just 
does not make sense. 
Further as to the Court's instructions as to the 
capacity, if plaintiff had testified that she worked there 
as a scrub woman, or any other capacity which was for-
eign to prostitution, plaintiff's objection to the instruc-
tion may have been well taken. However, the admitted 
business for which plaintiff worked in the district, that 
of a dance hall girl in a red light district where she so-
licited dances from strange men and after each dance 
took them to a bar where she made a percentage off the 
sale of liquor, is such a nefarious occupation, that the 
jury could not under any circumstances have arrived at 
any other verdict. 
Prostitution, and the lewd conduct of prostitutes are 
of their very nature secretive and cannot be demonstrat-
ed in the open. That, of course is the reason for a com-
munity as the City of Ely designating a certain area for 
them to operate and thus limit this secretive· and un-
wholesome occupation to a designated area. Therefore, 
under the state of the record and the admitted location of 
the business, the jury could not have found otherwise 
under any instructions. 
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In Com·monwealth v. Lavery, 93 Atl. 276, 247 Penn. 
787, the Court defines a prostitute as "a woman who has 
given herself up to indiscriminate lewdness." 
17 Am. Jur. 109 Sec. 7: 
"In the prosecution for resorting to a house 
of ill fame for purposes of lewdness, however, it 
is not necessary to prove that more females than 
tl1e proprietress illicit acts of intercourse. 
"It is necessary that the persons resorting to 
such a house do so for the purpose of indulging in 
lews acts, such as having sexual intercourse~." 
In the present case under the instruction and taking 
the testimony of plaintiff as to her capacity in the house 
of prostitution how can plaintiff complain if she is said 
to be a "whore." Her capacity as she testified to, was 
that of soliciting men, promiscuously to dance with her 
(Trans. 21) for money and buy two drinks, hers being 
a drink that was camaflouged so that she would not be-
come intoxicated, and called caramel water (Trans. 52, 
line 16) and she would get a commission from the sale 
(trans. p. 24). 
Plaintiff testified that there were houses up and 
down the street from the dance hall and that girls stood 
in front of them and that these were known as "crib 
girls" and that they were working on the line." Plaintiff 
testified that she well knew that these girls worked in 
these houses and that they either sat in the door way of 
the houses or in the windows. (trans. 26) 
These were the admitted surroundings of plaintiff's 
employment. 
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Now, when the jury, under the· instruction found the 
place was a horuse of ill fame:, plaintiff cannot be heard to 
complain that she was said to have been a "whore." 
It is evident that the Court, by the words, "in any 
capacity" intended that the jury examine plaintiff's testi-
mony as a dance hall girl, and if the place she was work-
ing was a house of prostitution she herself might be clas-
sified as a "whore under the circumstances." A "madam" 
or an operator of a house of prostitution, who does not 
have sexual intercourse with men for hire, certainly can-
not complain if someone said of her that she was a 
"whore." 
A me ric an Law Institute, Torts, p. 308, Sec. 617 : 
"Subject to the control of the Court whenever 
the issue arises the jury determines whether the 
defamatory matter was published of and concern-
ing the plaintiff and whethe-r it was true or false. 
"COMMENT (a) The respective functions 
of Court and jury upon the issue of publication 
and the issue of truth are the same as upon ordi-
nary issue of fact in other actions. The question 
whether the defendant has published the defama-
tory communications to a third person is ordi-
narily one for the jury or other trier of fact to 
determine. So too, it is ordinarily for the jury 
to determine whether the defamatory imputations 
are true. If, however, the evidence on either ques-
tion is so overwhelming that any other conclusion 
would be unreasonable, the Court may direct the 
jury to make a proper finding." 
And again A.L.I. Ch. 25. Sec. 582 P. 218: 
"It is not necessary to prove the literal truth 
of the precise statement made. Slight inaccuracies 
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of expression are in1material, provided the de-
famatory eharge is true in substance. Further-
more, it is enough to establish the truth of the 
charge of a criminal offense· by a preponderance 
of the evidence. It is not necessary if the person 
defamed were being prosecuted for the crime 
'Yhich he is charged with committing." 
In the case of State v. Rice, 56 Iowa 431, the Court 
held it was not for the Court to say that sexual inter-
course is or is not sufficient to establish a woman to be 
a prostitute. The Court: 
"It is certainly true, we think, that a woman 
may be a prostitute and carry on the business 
as such if she holds herself out to carry on the 
business of such, and if she holds herself out to 
the world. The houses may be designated by a 
sign as to make this clearly apparent. She may 
upon the street or in other public or private places, 
so conduct herself, as to make it clear she is a 
prostitute therefore that Mary Royce should have 
submitted herself to illicit sexual intercourse with 
various persons and that 'inconsistent with one· or 
two persons would not be sufficient to show she 
was a prostitute.' 
"We think it is for the jury to say whether 
this would be sufficient, taking into.consideration 
the circumstances and the: acts and conduct of 
Mary Royce, at the time and before the sexual 
intercourse took place." 
In other words, the accompanying circumstances 
are important and it is not for the Court to say the· sexual 
intercourse alone is, or is not sufficient to establish the 
woman to be a prostitute. 
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53 C.J.S. 225 Sec. 137: 
"In order to constitute a complete defense 
truth pleaded in justification must meet the pre-
cise charge and be as broad as the defamatory ac-
cusation substantial truth is sufficient. 
"While matter of justification by means of 
a plea of the truth to be of any avail, must meet 
and answer the substance of the: defamatory 
charge it need not meet absolutely the letter and 
form of the charge, or every word thereof, nor 
need it be literally true, substantial justification 
or truth that is truth in all material subjects, 
being sufficient." 
In Masao Yoshimura K urata v. Los Angeles News 
Pub. Co., Cal. 40 Pac. 2nd 526; 4 Cal. App. 2nd 224; 
Court stated (at page 522*) this rule as follows : 
"It is well settled that a defendant is not re-
quired in an action of libel to justify every word 
of the alleged defamatory matter; it is sufficient 
if the substance, the gist, the sting of the libelous 
charge be justified and if the. gist of the charge 
be established by the evidence, the defendant has 
made his case. A plea of justification is sustained 
by justifying so much of the defamatory matter as 
constitutes the sting of the charge. It is unneces-
sary to repeat and justify every word of the al-
leged defamatory matter if the substance of the 
charge be· justified. If the substantial imputations 
be proved true, a slight inaccuracy in the. details 
will not prevent a judgment for the defendant, if 
the inaccuracy does not change the complexion of 
the affair so as to affeet the reader of the article 
differently than the actual truth would." 
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S·utheTland on Dam£~ges, \T ol. 3, p. ·2626: 
''It is not the n1ere fact that difference exists 
bet\Yeen the published report of what the com-
plaint in the proceeding charged and what was 
actually alleged in the complaint, but rather in the 
difference of a substantial character and does it 
_ produce a different effect." 
Hornyak v. Heart Corp., 66 N.Y.S. 2nd 848, the rule 
was stated: 
"In determining the sufficiency of a defense 
of publication a workable test is whether the libel 
as published would have a different effect on the 
mind of the reader from that which the pleaded 
proof would have produced." 
"When the truth is so near to the facts as 
published that fine and shaded distinctions must 
be drawn and words passed out of the ordinary 
usage to sustain a change of libel, no legal harm 
has been done." (Citing Fleckenstein v. Freidman, 
266 N.Y. 19; 193 N.E. 537, 538.) 
See also Cafferty v. Fier, Pub. Co., 226 N.Y. 87. 
Counsel commences his argument on page 17 of ap-
pellant's brief as follows: 
"Granted for sake of argument that the jury 
found that either the 'Green Lantern' or 
'Rhiney's Place' was a house of prostitution, the 
plaintiff's action was removed from the considera-
tion of the jury." 
However, the instruction complained of required 
that the· jury must find the place where plaintiff worked 
was a house of prostitution. We submit further the part 
in "any capacity" referred specifically to a "dance hall 
I 
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girls'' "percentage girl"' "bee girl" or any other name 
given to women in this district engaged in the unsavory 
work which plaintiff admitted that she did. Therefore 
her capacity was established by the plaintiff, and the 
Court, we submit, rightfully instructed the jury that if 
they found these facts to exist, then they must find the 
issues in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, "no 
cause of action." 
POINT II. 
NOW AS TO POINT TWO THAT THE COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL AFTER THE FIRST TRIAL 
HAD RESULTED IN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
Counsel in his brief argues that due diligence was 
not exercised on the. part of the defendant in discover-
ing this evidence, because she may have discovered it had 
she taken the deposition of plaintiff or served her with 
written interrogatories; and in View of the: fact that the 
defendant did neither, but just stumbled on to all of the 
evidence which she later found, she should later be pre-
cluded from offering it. 
The defendant at the time of the first trial had no 
means of knowing that the rumor she had heard and had 
repeated of and concerning plaintiff, stemmed from plain-
tiff's activities in Ely, Nevada. In this case there has 
been no showing of lack of diligence merely because de-
fendant did not take the deposition of plaintiff, or serve 
written interrogatories on her. We submit that in this 
regard a wide discretion is given the trial court in view 
of all the circumstances of each case. 
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.. One seeking a ne"" trial for newly discovered 
evidence cannot be accused of lack of diligence 
when possesses no n1eans of kno,v-ing that the evi-
dence subsequently discovered w·as previously ob-
tainable. Henderson v. Edwards, 191 Iowa 871, 
183 N.\\T. 583, 16 A.L.R. 1090. The Court at page 
1092: "The right to a ne"\v trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence is statutory, and a 
ruling upon the motion involves legal discretion, 
and ordinarily, the ruling of the trial court will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless a reasonably 
clear ease of abuse or discretion is presented.' Cit-
ing Mullong v. Mullong, 178 Iowa 552, 159 N.W. 
994.'' 
"The granting or the denial of a new trial on 
the ground of newly discovered evidence is within 
the discretion of the trial court, and its discretion 
will not be disturbed except where there is a 
clear abuse of discretion." King v. Consolidated 
Products, Kan. 608, 157 P. 2nd 541, 158 A.L.R. 
1248. 
"A motion for a new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the court and its exercise of 
that discretion will not be disturbed except for 
manifest abuse." Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 
5 Wash. 2nd 284, 105 P. 2nd 76, 130 A.L.R. 606. 
See also Hamilton v. Swigact Coal Mine, 59 Wyo. 
485, P. 2nd 203, 149 A.L.R. 998 ; 
State v. Zimmerman, 60 N.D. 256, 253 N. W. 845, 
79 A.L.R. 816. 
This doctrine has been well established by this Hon-
orable Court from time to time. 
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In Glazier v. Cram, 71 Utah 465, 267 Pac. 188, this 
Court held the granting or denying of a motion for a new 
trial on the ground of misconduct of the jury is a matter 
largely within the discretion of the trial court. 
In Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 P. 2nd 1155, this 
Court held: 
"The motion for a new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence was a matter wholly 
within the trial court's discretion. As long as the 
discretion is not abused, this Court will not inter-
fere." 
In Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, at p. 74 (282) p. 
1034, this court held : 
"In this jurisdiction the binding effect of find-
ings of the trial Court in law cases is different 
from that in equity cases. In the former the find-
ings as a general rule are approved if there is suf-
ficient competent evidence to support them, and 
ordinarily, are not disturbed unless it is manifest 
that they are so clearly against the weight of the 
evidence as to indicate a misconception or not a 
on due consideration to it." 
In the present case the court first granted defend-
ant's motion for a new trial and thereafter set aside the 
order and referred it to, Judge Ellett who held a special 
hearing and made findings upon them. (R. 13) After 
carefully considering the findings of Judge Ellett, Judge 
Jeppson then granted a new trial. 
We think the two Utah cases cited by counsel in his 
brief, as to wit, Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2nd 
176 and Bowers v. Gray, 99 Utah 336, 106 P. 2nd 765, are 
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not in point and cannot apply to this case. 
In both of those cases this Court pointed out that it 
'vas reluctant to reverse a trial court for granting a new 
trial but that there w·as apparently no basis for the trial 
court's granting the new trial. 
In the present case the entire newly discovere·d evi-
dence was of such a nature that to have denied defend-
ant's motion and refused the new trial could have been 
a denial of the ends of justice to say the least. 
The new evidence was of such a nature that defend-
ant presented an entirely different defense in the: second 
trial, to wit, the truth of the alleged slanderous state~ 
ments. 
As counsel has pointed out he has found no cases 
holding that unless a party to an action either take the 
opponent's deposition or serve written interrogatories 
on opponent before trial, that he has not exercised such 
due diligence as would prevent ~he granting of a new 
trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. 
We submit however, that in granting the new trial 
Judge Jeppson properly exercised his discretionary 
power and that there was no abuse thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we submit that the. trial Court com-
mitted no error upon either point which would justify 
this Honorable Court in granting a new trial, or making 
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any order other than to affir1n the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LaMAR DUNCAN, 
E. LeROY SHIELDS, 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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